Thank you, Mr Chair,
After reading the concept paper of today’s meeting and listening to the briefers I understand that the aim of this meeting was to be nothing more than a propaganda exercise to undermine the credibility and professionalism of the OPCW, and thereby absolve the Syrian regime of responsibility for the most heinous crimes. Let me be clear – Estonia fully supports the OPCW Technical Secretariat and has full confidence in the work of its investigative mechanisms. I heard nothing today that makes me doubt in the OPCW investigative methods and conclusions, or the organization’s ability to implement its mandate.
I will take this opportunity now to address the implementation of the Security Council resolution 2118, which in several aspects remains inadequate. I will focus on three points of concern. Estonia aligns itself also with the statement presented later today by Denmark on behalf of a group of Nordic-Baltic countries.
First, resolution 2118 stipulates that the Syrian Arab Republic shall not use, develop, produce, otherwise acquire, stockpile or retain chemical weapons. It is now the 10th year of human tragedy in Syria. During these 10 years, Syrian regime has repeatedly used chemical weapons for their strategic aims to suppress opposition and terrorise its people. We have seen this in Ghouta, Douma, Sarmin, Khanh Shaykhun and elsewhere. The UN-OPCW Joint Investigative Mechanism has determined four instances where the Syrian regime has used chemical weapons against its own people. Most recently, the OPCW Investigation and Identification Team concluded that the Syrian Arab Air Forces were responsible for three chemical weapons attacks against the Syrian people in Ltamenah in March 2017. It is not the case, as argued by Russia, that it is the Western countries’ baseless claim that the Syrian government continues to use chemical weapons. The use of chemical weapons by the Syrian regime against its own people is proven by consistent and solid evidence, provided by the best experts in this field.
It is unfortunate that Russia and China chose not to attend the Security Council meeting in May during the Estonian presidency where the OPCW Director-General Arias and the IIT coordinator, Ambassador Oñate came to brief the Council on the results of the first IIT report. Otherwise, they would have heard explanations about the mandate and criteria for the creation of the IIT, its working methods and that proper consideration was given to different hypothesis of what had happened.
Second, in resolution 2118 the Security Council determined that the use of chemical weapons anywhere constitutes a threat to international peace and security and expressed its strong conviction that those individuals responsible for the use of chemical weapons must be held accountable. In the face of clear evidence of the use of chemical weapons, the Security Council has an obligation to act and respond decisively. Regrettably, so far it has greatly failed to do so. All attempts in the Council to move towards accountability for the use of chemical weapons in Syria have been blocked by the Russian Federation’s veto.
Estonia welcomes the OPCW Executive Council decision of 9 July, which condemned the findings of the IIT report and provided a deadline for Syria to comply with its obligations and the Chemical Weapons Convention.
Estonia also continues to support accountability mechanisms that a wide UN membership has put in place to combat impunity. We emphasize our strong support for the International, Impartial and Independent Mechanism and the Commission of Inquiry. We also support the French Partnership against impunity.
Impunity cannot be an option when we talk about the use of weapons of mass destruction.
Finally, I want to return to the issue of systematic and targeted attempts to undermine the OPCW Technical Secretariat and its investigative mechanisms. This has a direct bearing to the international architecture against the use of chemical weapons and is not conducive to the implementation of resolution 2118. The overarching aim of the Russian and Syrian disinformation campaigns is to sow distrust against the most competent organization to deal with chemical weapons, because this organisation has come to conclusions, which are inconvenient for them. This is done by using contradictory, incoherent and malicious arguments in regards to the OPCW reports and its experts. Efforts to undermine the OPCW include even attempts to break into its computer systems. The aim of spreading the conspiracy theories is to make us believe that nothing is certain and nothing can be trusted anymore. The aim is to fracture the international chemical non-proliferation regime to shield the brutal actions of the Syrian regime but perhaps even to shield the actions of one’s own. In this regard, we urge Russia to cooperate closely with the OPCW and provide an account how the nerve agent novichok came to be used in the poisoning of Mr Navalny.
Mr Chair,
The use of chemical weapons presents a serious security threat to all states. Members of this Council have an obligation to prevent the use of weapons of mass destruction, not to encourage it or enable it.
I thank you.